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Abstract
Battleships is a well known traditional board game for two players
which dates from World War I. Though, the game has several digital
version implementations, they are affected by similar major drawbacks
such as fairness and a trust model that relies on third party. In this
paper, we demonstrate how to implement a fair, resistant to denial-of-
service, where the honest winner earns the deposit money immediately.
The game is built on a permissionless Blockchain that supports Turing
complete smart-contract computation. Furthermore, we provide a full
working game implementation1 of this proposition over the Ethereum
Blockchain.
1 Introduction - Basic Battleships rules
This section describes the basic rules of the classic battleships game, which
establishes the basis for our novel contribution. Battleships is a popular
traditional board game[9] for two players, where each player is required to
hold a board game of 10×10 cell size. In each board, the players need to place
down a fleet of 5 battleships, where each battleship has different sizes and
occupies consecutive cells in the board. Each cell can either be a battleship’s
part or an empty cell. This classic game has the following stages:
1. Placing the Battleships. To commence the game, each player needs
to secretly arrange their fleets. The battleships can be placed in hori-
zontal or vertical arrangement with each player possessing a predefined
equal amount and types of battleships.
∗E-mail: Barshag@post.bgu.ac.il
1 The front-end game will be released on the website: http://www.playonchains.com.
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In this phase, each player also creates another board with the same size
in order to record the torpedoes shot into the opponent’s fleet, as well
as their status (hit or miss).
2. Launching Torpedoes in turns. This phase operates in rounds,
where the players switch their roles in each round. In a single round,
there is one player shooting a torpedo into one of the cells of the oppo-
nent’s board and on announcing the exact cell that is being targeted,
both players have to record the shot. Then, the opponent announces
whether this cell contains a part of his own battleships (i.e the oppo-
nent announces whether it is a hit or miss shot). In a situation where
all parts of the ship have been affected, the owner of that ship must
announce ”This ship was sunk”.
3. Termination of the game. In the eventual outcome that a fleet of one
of the players is sunk (i.e all the battleships are sunk), the game ends
and the opponent will be announced as the winner. Pedantic players
at this stage will perform comparison of their own records against the
private opponent’s board arrangement to obtain some 2 guarantee that
they have not been cheated.
2 Why play battleships over the Blockchain?
2.1 Limitation of the Battleships’ centrelized variant
A typical battleships game is normally hosted on a third party centralized
server, however, this approach suffers from the following limitations.
Trusting the server. In a centralized server scenario, the players must
rely on the information coming from the server, since it acts as a media-
tor, unlike the case of dishonest server, which may be problematic due to
erroneous information. Furthermore, when money is involved in the games,
a server may decide whether or not to transfer money to the player who
wins the game. In addition, a potential hacker may have the opportunity to
exploit such loopholes to manipulate the performance of the server, which
inherently influences the outcome of the game.
2This will not give them a full guarantee, since a malicious opponent could perform
Dynamically changing battleship’s location attack. We describe that attack in Section 3.1
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A X · · · · · · · · ·
B X · · · · · · · · ·
C X · · · · · · X · ·
D · · X X X X · X · ·
E · · · · · · · X · ·
F · X X · · · · X · ·
G · · · X · · X · ·
H · · · · · · · · · ·
I · · · · · · · · · ·
J · · · · · · · · · ·
Table 1: A typical Battleships board game of 10×10 cell size and 5 battleships
of sizes: 1× 1, 1× 2, . . . , 5× 5.
Game suspected to a Denial of Service attack (DoS). At any point
in the game, a player who is not satisfied with the score of the game (or for
any other reason), has the privilege to launch a denial of service campaign
on the server. This is possible, since the server has a single point of failure
and there are several low cost service providers for DDoS [6]. An example of
DDoS attack that occurred in the wild, can be found in [4].
2.2 Playing the game over a Blockchain
A Blockchain architecture that allows arbitrary computation (i.e. Smart
contract [11]) offers several advantages over a centralized variant, and can
mitigate the mentioned flaws from Section 2.1.
2.2.1 Blockchain benefits
In this section, we describe the benefits of executing the game over a Blockchain
instead of using centralized server.
Decentralization. A Blockchain that allows Turing-complete computa-
tion executes commands across multiple machines, which are called nodes.
This architecture enables a trust-less computation and validation over blockchain
nodes. This property is in contrast to the case of executing the game on a sin-
gle server, which makes the Blockchain resilient to denial-of-service attacks.
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Hence, to ”shut down” the computation mechanism, an attacker needs to
attack several highly maintained servers across the Internet instead of just a
few.
”The code is the law” paradigm. Once a smart-contract is uploaded
into the blockchain, it cannot be changed3. Thus, in a situation where the
game is developed with fair rules that can be audited (since the bytecodes
are publicly available once uploaded), it becomes infeasible for some entity
to interfere and change the rules during an instance of a game.
Participating in the game cannot be prevented from anyone. In
addition to the above benefits, playing on a permissionless Blockchain cannot
be censored by a single authority, since every player can create a wallet on
their own.
Instant payment. The smart contract code has the ability to transfer
money based on certain predetermined programmed rules. Whenever such
rules occur, money transfer to a player’s wallet cannot be prevented. In our
Battleships game, the winner immediately receives the deposit money of both
players (in Ether).
3 How to enforce fair play?
3.1 Survey of possible attacks
Building a game over a Blockchain can be mistakenly interpreted to be re-
silient to cyber attacks. However, such statement tends to be invalid, because
a naive implementation would suffer from the following attacks.
Keeping secrets. Since the Blockchain maintains a public ledger, putting
secret values will expose it to potential cheats, in which an adversary can scan
the Blockchain and launch torpedoes on the public locations of his adversary.
This is a well known vulnerability that occurs in Blockchain’s architecture,
more details on this vulnerability can be found in [5].
Dynamically changing battleships’ location. In this attack, the
attacker may change the location of the ships dynamically, in his own favor,
without updating the other player. Thus, in a condition where there is no
3This claim is not 100% guaranteed, for example in the cases of fork that may arise
spontaneously, or with an occurrence of 51% attack, which is rare on a popular Blockchains
such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.
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enforcement on the location after the first stage of placing the Battleships,
an attacker can attain a major advantage in the game.
Inappropriate placement of the battleships. Using this attack, an
attacker can place only a subset of the battleships or the entire battleships
such that its parts are neither consecutive or nor forming the correct shape
of the ship.
Implementation’s vulnerabilities. As for any other software, every
game could have vulnerabilities and this is specifically more prominent in the
logic game executed over blockhcain. A comprehensive survey and taxonomy
can be found in [5].
3.2 Design concepts
Herein we describe the design requirements that will mitigate the above at-
tacks.
Security requirements.
1. A player that picks a board layout have to commit the board at the
beginning of the game, which must not be changed before the game
finishes (i.e. a cheater cannot change the location of the battleships
without being caught);
2. The above commitment, must not expose any value of the location of
the battleships (i.e the locations of the battleships must remain pri-
vate).
3. The type and size of battleships of the players must obey predefined
set of rules (i.e. there must be battleships of sizes 1× 5, 1× 4, etc.).
4. In each turn, the players need to provide a proof of not cheating about
the exact value of the previous torpedo shot toward them, whether it
was a Hit or a Miss.
5. Whenever a player makes claim for a victory, he must provide proof
that he was not cheated with regard to the location of the battleships.
6. The game should have a penalty mechanism for a malicious user who
is not taking any action at a particular period of time. (i.e the game
must prevent the user from freezing the deposit of money in the smart
contract due to not continuing the game).
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Architecture requirements.
1. The smart contract code of each move should be as light as possible.
This requirement is crucial to minimize the finance costs, as well as to
provide good user experience.
2. The code should be audited by independent researchers in order to
lower the number of implementation’s bugs.
3.3 Game design overview
This section provides a brief overview of the game design, according to dif-
ferent phases of the game.
3.3.1 Registration Phase
Two different parties are required to register at the beginning of the game,
where both parties make a joint decision on the amount of money to com-
mit to the game. The deposited money is considered a major factor which
enforces the players to play by the rules, because any attempt to cheat in
the game will result in a punishment of giving the deposited money to the
opponent.
3.3.2 Placing the battleships
The players will then choose where to place their battleships on the board
using the game user interface (UI). Afterward, a player who is satisfied with
the layout of his own fleet, must upload the computed root of the merkle-tree
to the smart contract of the game (in a specified period of time).
Merkle tree of the board. A merkle tree (MT)[7] is a cryptographic
structure that allows for efficient and secure verification of content. This
structure helps to verify the consistency and content of the data. The struc-
ture is a binary tree, where every leaf node is labeled with the hash of a data
block that it represents and every non-leaf node is labeled with the crypto-
graphic hash of the labels of its child nodes. The topmost node is called the
root (similar to a regular binary tree).
In our design, every leaf node is labeled with a data block in the form of
x||r, where x denotes whether there exist a ship with size x in the respective
6
cell, or not (i.e x = 0), and r is a sufficient4 large random value, where the
excess number of leafs equals to 0 (those leafs completes the tree to a full
binary tree with 27 = 128 cells). An illustration of concrete merkle-tree of a
simplified board can be seen in Figure 1.
1 2
A X ·
B X ·
⇒
Root
A1-A2
A1
2205
A2
0813
B1-B2
B1
2932
B2
0417
Figure 1: Simplified 2× 2 Battleships’ board game with only one battleship
of size two, and the corresponding merkle-tree structure of that board.
Broadcasting the MT-root will enforce the player to commit the cho-
sen board and force him not to change it later on, since a cryptographic
hash function is a one-way function, which is resilient to second-preimage
attack5. Furthermore, when broadcasting this root into the blockhcain, no
single value from the underneath values will be revealed, due to the use of
random concatenation of each value.
3.3.3 Launching Torpedoes
In each turn6, a player that wants to launch a torpedo, must broadcast the
underneath value of the previous opponent’s shot, along with a proof that it
is the real value.
The proof is delivered by a MT-path from the MT-root till the targeted
cell number of the previous opponent moves and this path will be verified on
the blockchain smart-contract. Only in a situation where the path is valid
4Common length of r can be at least 128 bit, to make it hard to guess the value of the
cell by performing Brute-force guessing.
5 The property of second-preimage resistance claims that it is computationally infeasible
to find any second input which has the same output as that of a specified input
6Not include the first move.
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(i.e. the leaf value fits with the root of the merkle tree uploaded in the first
phase), will the player be permitted to perform the next move. Furthermore,
we also enforce time constraint to perform valid moves, in order to avoid a
denial of service attack at a particular instance of game.
3.3.4 Final game verification
Finally, the smart contract will enforce the candidate winner, which is the
player that achieves a correct guess of the entire fleet of the opponent, to
reveal his own battleships’ locations. Such rule is necessary to mitigate the
Inappropriate placement of battleships attack.
In case the player refuses to provide a valid MT-paths, he will be tagged
as a cheater, and the punishment is that the other player will be announced
as the winner, and thus receive the deposited money.
3.4 Software architecture of the game
We describe the software architecture of our proposed game design in this
section in order to offer a comprehensive overview of the game. The design
of the game relies on the 3-tiers architecture [10], which is very similar to a
typical decentralized application (dapps). An illustration of these layers is
depicted in Figure 3.4.
1. Presentation layer - This layer is responsible for the UI, which in-
cludes the following components:
• HTML and JScript code that manages the UI of the game. It
also includes client side code which ensures game play follow the
specified protocol 7
• Web3.js [2] is the layer that connects the HTML client code to
interact with the game’s smart contract.
• Metamask wallet[3] enables the users to commit transaction to the
blockchain.
2. Logic layer - This layer is responsible for enforcement of the game
rules and it is placed in the smart contract code. The layer includes
the following components:
7This feature is not taken into account in the security analysis, since it is not prevented
from malicious attacker who can change the code, and bypass the mechanisms.
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• Verification of the boards’ MT-path which relies on the solidity
library called merkle-tree-solidity [1].
• Authentication and authorization of the players that participate
in the game.
• Verification of the game rules and validity of transmitted data.
3. Data layer -This layer is responsible for storing the data that is trans-
ferred to the blockchain and includes the following values:
• The MT-root of the board.
• The revealed value of cells in the board introduced by previous
moves.
Presentation layer -
HTML and JScript code
Logic layer-
Battleships smart contract
Data layer -
Stored on the blockchain
MT.sol
Web3.js
Board
Committed values
Figure 2: Overview of the architecture’s scheme
3.5 Security analysis
We give a brief security analysis by considering a semi-honest attacker whose
computational resources are polynomial bounded. We defer the formal proofs
to a full version of this article that will be published in a Journal.
3.5.1 Security
This game inherits the basic security mechanism of blockchain which in-
cludes:
• Authentication of the players during the game will be performed via
private key which controls their wallet.
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• Authorization of performing moves in turns by restricting moves to
current player’s turn, using smart-contract restrictions.
We now proceed to analysis of countermeasures to the types of cheats
that were introduced in Section 3.1.
Types of cheats. As discussed previously, any kind of cheat will be
punished immediately, by enforcing the rules in the smart contract code.
Table 2 describes cases of potential cheats and how the architecture monitors
such cheats in the smart contract.
Type of cheat Countermeasure mechanism
Unresponsive player Each turn is time bounded8.
Dynamically changing ships The board is committed via MT-root which
stays permanent during a game instance.
Any attempt to change the location will pro-
duce a fake proof, that the smart contract
identifies.
Inappropriate placement The winner is forced to reveal his fleet before
he receives the payment. In case the amount
or layout of the battleships does not follow
the rules, the player will be punished.
Table 2: Types of cheats and the corresponding countermeasure mechanisms
programmed into the smart contract code.
3.5.2 Privacy
The main privacy issue is how to hide the locations of players’ battleships.
Since the entire data in the transactions and smart contracts’ fields are public,
it must be ensured that they have not exposed parts of battleships locations
which are yet to be made public. To that end, we examine the messages in
each round of the game.
1. Commitment phase - hash function is a one-way function by defini-
tion (i.e. given an hash output, it is hard to compute the corresponding
input). Thus, an attacker that wants to match boards of size 100 with
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the root hash value will have to generate the entire board cells and then
compute its MT. Since, we concatenate to each block data, a random
number with a sufficiently large length, the whole computation com-
plexity is approximately O((2λ)100), where we denote λ as the length
of r value in bits and in this experiment we use λ > 128 bits. Hence,
the locations of the boards remain private against a computationally
bounded adversary.
2. Launching torpedoes phase - in every turn, a player must reveal his
targeted board’s cell that was threatened by the previous turn. To this
end, he broadcast a MT-path from the MT-root till that cell. It is easy
to see that the publicly path does not reveal any other intermediate
values, which in order to guess them, the attacker needs to generate 2λ
values, as cryptographic hash function is a one-way function.
3. Termination phase - the purpose of this phase is to reveal the can-
didate’s fleet location. Thus, we do not consider any privacy issues in
this phase, since the locations are not kept secret at the end of the
game.
3.6 Computational analysis
This section is concerned with the communication and computational anal-
yses, which is important to understand the complexity of executing the
game, since the computational cost of the game (in Ethereum gas units)
is proportional to the number of operations and the data transmitted to the
blockchain. However, we defer the in-depth details of these analyses to the
full publication of this article, while we provide here only theoretical analysis.
Let us denote [H], [B], [BS] as the length in bits of the hash function’s
output, the amount of the cells in the Battleships’ board, and the amount of
battleships in the game, respectively.
Communication analysis.
• Commitment phase -both players transmit [H] bytes of the MT-root.
• Torpedo launching phase - red in each round, the current player trans-
mits MT-path of size [H] · log([B]) and a cell number of size log([B])
bits.
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Computational analysis.
It is easy to see that the major costly operations derive from the MT
proof checking and the termination phase. Thus, the former computation is
bounded by 2[B] · [MTP ], where [MTP ] denotes the cost of executing MT-
proof, and the latter computation is bounded by the number of battleships.
This is due to the fact that once the valid battleships cells have been received,
we only need to check that they are tied to each other.
4 Future advance mechanisms
In this section, we present ideas that describe how to extend our proposed
game, to include more sophisticated game features and advance game man-
agement mechanisms. We also defer the comprehensive description of those
features to the full publication version of this article.
4.0.1 Game variations
• Multi-player case. A trivial extension is to simply increase the game
to n-multi-player game, where in each turn a player will have the priv-
ilege to choose the specific board to launch a torpedo toward.
• Additional assets. In this case, several additional features will be
included such as mines, fishes, etc. Players can purchase assets and
obtain more rewards for the players. For example, an event of discov-
ering a mine will immediately release a fixed amount of money to the
adversary. These assets can easily be an ERC tokens (both ERC-20 or
ERC-721 types).
4.0.2 Game management
• Minimize the cost of moves. Since each move involves executing
transaction on the blockchain, it is desirable to minimize the number of
operations to reduce the costs of playing the game. One possible way is
to decrease the number of data that is pushed to the main blockchain,
by using plasma chains [8]. The latter approach will also increase user
usability, since every move will not enforce metamask transaction pop-
box.
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• Enforcing the locations of battleships in advance. To enforce
that the players’ boards is containing exactly (predefined constant) T
cells of battleships and that each battleships parts are in a consecutive
manner, we can use zero-knowledge proofs. This approach however may
increase the communication complexity overhead, which inherently in-
creases the cost of playing the game.
• Catching cheaters in advance. In our proposed mechanism, despite
devising a means for discovering a cheater who tries to change the
battleships’ locations or sizes and also preventing any form of money
theft from the other player at the end of the game, the cheater could
still manage to waste the time of the player and postpone the immediate
discovery of cheating until the end of the game.
This phenomena occurs since the committed MT-root does not provide
a proof of arrangement of the battleships, because the validation of the
arrangement only occurs at the end of the game, by the smart contract
code. A solution to this problem is to use the zero-knowledge schemes.
In contrast to this, we can transform this ”bug” into a feature by adding
a nice ”Poker” mechanism feature to the game which allows the players
the ability to bluff each other. As such, a player can choose whether
he cheats in advance or not, in the first phase of the game. At any
point in time in the game, a player can then guess whether the other
player had bluffed him or not. In case the ”cheat” is confirmed, then
the player will receive an amount that is inversely proportional to the
number of rounds of game already played.
• Blacklist of cheaters. After detecting cheats in the game, it is pos-
sible to take actions against the users that were involved in cheat-
ing. Such actions to those cheaters can be ban them from partici-
pating. However, this feature is in conflict with our requirement to
non-censorship game.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we proposed the first decentralized Battleships game,
which is composed of various cryptographic components to enforce
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fairness, keep battleships’ location secret and protect honest players
from malicious cheaters. Furthermore, playing battleships over the
blockchain provides major benefits such as making the game DDoS re-
sistant, where the money is transferred immediately to the winner, or
to the opponent in case cheating is discovered. The logic of the game
is developed using solidity language and deploy over the Ethereum
blockchain as a smart contract.
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Figure 3: A screenshot from the current UI implementation.
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